

INTRODUCTION

Hostage Negotiation (HN) began as an innovative NYPD practice almost 30 years ago. The original NYPD HN plan was developed in response to the terrorist attack against Israeli athletes at the 1972 Munich Olympic Games. The assessment at the time was that New York City was a probable terrorist target and that a hostage or siege situation was likely since there had been a number of such incidents, including skyjacking, primarily throughout Europe and the Middle East, in the preceding years.

Actual terrorist hostage holdings in NYC have not occurred, although siege events inside three foreign missions to the UN closely mimicked genuine hostage situations. The nature of actions that negotiators are dispatched to has been expanded to include trapped perpetrators, emotionally disturbed persons, suicide attempts, high risk raid and warrant preparation, and kidnap and extortion investigations. Some of these incidents involved hostages while others were more akin to barricade or siege operations. NYPD negotiators have probably responded to more than 2000 events since their team was first formed. They have also shared their knowledge and experience with law enforcement agencies throughout the country and around the world. Interestingly, the original HN methodology has not changed dramatically.

The FBI became involved in HN research, response and training in 1973 and has been involved in negotiation and rescue operations throughout the US and worldwide ever since. By 1999, some derivation of the original NYPD HN policy had been adopted by most of the police departments in the country that employ at least 100 sworn officers. During the summer of 2001 the newly formed National Council of Negotiation Associations (NCNA) in conjunction with the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) recommended that all law enforcement agencies should maintain a negotiation capability either in-house or through mutual aid.

And then came 9/11/01!

An early reaction to the devastation by a veteran police practitioner turned academic, including the death of friends and colleagues, was that hostage negotiation might no longer have a place in our society; all bets were off. Then, the other side of the brain woke up with a realization that now, perhaps more than ever before, democratic policing must be prepared to engage in meaningful dialogues with despicable people in order to help save lives.

This paper will discuss some terrorist related aspects of hostage negotiation from the perspective of a research project: The Structure and Procedures of Hostage/Crisis Negotiation

Units in U.S. Police Organizations (Louden, 1999). Further, several events subsequent to the actual attacks, including Bin Laden's reported statement that not all of the hijackers were fully aware of the ultimate plan and the sympathetic copy-cat teenage suicide event in Tampa, Florida would tend to indicate that negotiation may have become a necessary reality even in those events.

A Definition of Hostage/Crisis Negotiation

Negotiation is a transaction between two parties, representing themselves or others, which is designed to arrive at a mutually agreeable resolution. A dictionary definition of negotiation (American Heritage, 1983) includes, "to confer with another in order to come to terms." Negotiation does not automatically presuppose equality between parties but does recognize the relative strength or power of each side. Implied in the negotiation process is that each side has something that the other wants, that there is no better mutually acceptable solution immediately available, and that there is a willingness to communicate and to discuss compromise.

Police officers engage in the practice of negotiation throughout their daily assignments, especially in these times of community policing and collaborative approaches to problem solving. They negotiate events such as noise complaints, neighborhood disputes, situations with disorderly youth, and parking conditions. The concept of negotiation that is the subject of this paper is somewhat more complex because issues of safety, life and death, are always present, and these situations typically involve the response of a large number of law enforcement personnel, a potentially confusing command structure and adherence to special procedures. Media attention is a given at virtually every hostage/crisis negotiation scene.

According to Crelinsten and Szabo (1979) "Hostage-taking is a very ancient form of criminal activity. In fact, it was even an accepted tool of diplomacy when used by legitimate authority" (p. ix). Levitt (1988) stated that hostage-taking is defined by the United Nations as "the seizing or detaining and threatening to kill, injure, or continue to detain another person to compel a third party to do or abstain from doing any act as a condition for the release of the hostage" (p.14). Rogan, et al (1997) reported that "hostage takers act to create an extortionate transaction with the police" (p. 3).

Hostage/crisis negotiation is a police strategy, which consists of responding to a situation that involves imminent danger to the life or limb of a person(s) being held against their will. There is not necessarily an immediately apparent connection between captor and victim, as Buhite (1995) noted, individuals are often “taken hostage [only] because they were available and vulnerable”(p.xv).

A law enforcement organization designates an individual as the negotiator to engage the hostage holder in a dialogue in an effort to find a peaceful resolution to the instant problem. The hostage holding may originally be motivated by criminal intent, emotional crisis or politics. The negotiator will attempt to persuade the holder to release the hostage(s) unharmed in return for a pledge that the captor will not be harmed and may actually be assisted in resolving problems in a legitimate way. In this way “negotiation is thought of as the process of discussion engaged in by two or more parties, each of which wants to achieve a desired aim” (Edleman and Crain, 1993, p. xii). For situations where negotiation does not seem to be effective, the process will attempt to facilitate the rescue of the victim and apprehension of the perpetrator by distracting or disabling the hostage holder. In a discussion on siege management, Bahn (1987) observed that a common element in hostage and barricaded subject incidents is defiance by the subject to orders of the authorities to come out peacefully. He noted that “a standoff develops between the overwhelming power -- manpower, firepower and legal authority -- of the police, military or other authorities and the defiant, trapped offender” (p. 1).

The negotiation process which is the subject of this paper involves “law enforcement officers who are selected and trained for the task and who are acting on behalf of their employing agency” (Volpe & Loudon, 1990, p.308). For many years the commonly used term was “hostage negotiation” and in many jurisdictions it still is. Since approximately 1989 (Kaiser, 1990) the FBI switched to “crisis negotiation” and many agencies have followed suit. The International Association of Chiefs of Police (1991) utilizes the term hostage communicator. The term hostage/crisis negotiation is utilized throughout this paper.

Police hostage/crisis negotiators view “the negotiation of substantive and non-substantive wants or demands in similar terms: agreement making through bargaining or problem solving, typically via quid pro quo” (Rogan, et al, 1997, p.11). Police hostage/crisis negotiation involves bargaining for the life of an innocent person, or may involve dealing with a non-hostage holding barricaded criminal, or dealing with individuals who may be emotionally disturbed or mentally

ill. Police generally engage in hostage/crisis negotiation in order to save hostage lives, without unnecessarily endangering the lives of the helpers. Captors and other subjects engage in negotiation for these same hostages for a variety of reasons, initially defined by the original motivation for the event, whether criminal, political or emotional.

A HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION HISTORY

Two hostage events, prior to September 1972 that occurred in New York State, one in 1971 and the other in 1972 are often referred to in the literature of hostage situations but did not at the time prompt any changes in law enforcement policy. The September 1971 Attica prison riot and hostage holding in northwest New York State resulted in death for twenty-eight correction officers and ten inmates during a rescue attempt. This tragedy prompted controversy in criminal justice and social science circles over force versus restraint in approaching hostage incidents (Garson, 1972; Wicker, 1975; Useem & Kimball, 1989; Shelton, 1994; Strollo and Wills-Raftery, 1994). It did not, however, prompt interest by the NYPD, perhaps because it involved prisoners and was contained within the walls of a correctional facility located hundreds of miles away. Similarly, almost one year later, in August 1972, a bank robbery hostage situation in Brooklyn, New York which has been perpetuated in a fictionalized account in the popular movie Dog Day Afternoon (1975) did not immediately result in seeing a need for change in situations involving hostages. However, Attica and Dog-Day as well as additional examples were examined later, when negotiation came to be seen as a viable strategy for dealing with hostage situations (Bolz & Hershey, 1979; Moorehead, 1980).

Cooper (1985) noted that there was a shift in official responses to hostage situations following the 1972 Munich Olympics incident, and Welch (1984) included a reference to the influence of the crisis at the 1972 Munich Olympics in his historical treatment of hostage negotiations. In the Munich Olympic hostage situation two members of the Israeli Olympic team were killed in the original takeover. Additionally, one West German police officer, five PLO terrorists and eight Israeli hostages died during an attempt to free the hostages by force (Schreiber, 1973; Moorehead, 1980; Soskis & Van Zandt, 1986).

The Munich event alerted the New York City Police Department that their jurisdiction could provide a similar opportunity for some group to engage in terroristic diplomacy. The fact that the hostage holding occurred during the International Olympics, involved American allies,

Israel and West Germany, and was broadcast live by the media was enough to prompt an immediate study of the issues (Gelb, 1977; Bolz and Hershey, 1979; Gettinger, 1983).

The post-Munich study period resulted in promulgation of new Recommended Guidelines; Incidents Involving Hostages (1973). These contingency plans stressed, “The primary consideration in such circumstances is to secure the lives and safety of the threatened hostages, the police officers, innocent bystanders, and the criminals themselves”(p.1). John A. Culley (1974), a Detective Bureau lieutenant, referring to the draft document, noted that Chief Inspector Michael J. Codd had recently “reviewed and approved plans for hostage situations, plans which [Codd] had been working on with various units of the police department since September 1972”(p.1). This original plan did not specifically mention hostage negotiators.

In a then far-reaching review of hostage incident responses Gettinger (1983) noted “Shortly after the Munich incident [1972], Patrick Murphy, the New York City Police Commissioner gave the order that New York should prepare itself for terrorist hostage-taking” (p.14). His Chief of Special Operations, Simon Eisendorfer, formed a committee consisting of patrol, detective, training and psychological services representatives. Gettinger further reported that the FBI followed suit in 1973 when it initiated research and training in hostage negotiation. One of the original FBI negotiators, Conrad Hassel, noted that this specialty was not even conceived until 1972 and that it soon spread across the country (see Gettinger, 1983). Soskis (1983), in an article which discussed behavioral scientists and law enforcement personnel working together, reviewed various possible collaborations and noted that the “new discipline of hostage negotiations . . . had its beginning in the New York City Police Department”(p.49). The first formal practice of police hostage negotiation was established in New York City during the period between September 1972 and April 1973 (Bell, 1978; Moorehead, 1980; Bolz and Hershey, 1979; Schlossberg and Freeman, 1974; Douglas & Olshaker, 1995; Loudon, 1998). It was established as a direct result of an attack by terrorists against US allies.

In January 1973 a significant event in the evolution of hostage negotiation took place over a two-day period in Brooklyn, New York at a location known as John & Al’s Sporting Goods Store. The local precinct police had responded to a silent alarm call of a possible robbery in progress and were met with gunfire from within the store. Reinforcements arrived, including ESU tactical officers, which is the equivalent of Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) Team personnel in some other jurisdictions. One ESU officer was killed and two other officers were

wounded in the quickly unfolding event. One of four suspects was also wounded and eight hostages were held in the store. The new operational plan for incidents involving hostages, that Chief Eisendorfer had organized a few months earlier at Commissioner Murphy's direction, was spontaneously field-tested for the first time. Its primary concerns were with containment of the scene, control of personnel and resources and communication with the captors (Cawley, 1974). Forty-seven hours after the incident began, all of the hostages were safe, the four perpetrators were in custody and there was no further injury to police officers or other responders.

A comprehensive critique of the incident at John & Al's was undertaken. Although, according to Welch (1984), the plan had not been eagerly received throughout the Department, its basic principles were validated by the activities surrounding the forty-seven-hour siege at John & Al's. Even though the original plan had stressed the importance of communicating with hostage holders, there had been no prior indication as to who the negotiator would be. The critique made commanders aware of "negotiation deficits" (Welch, p. 66). A wide variety of police and non-police had 'negotiated' during the forty-seven hours, largely without measurable success. As a result of the incident, the idea of having specific individuals designated as hostage negotiators was introduced into the NYPD for the first time. By April 1973 a team of negotiators had been selected from the ranks of the Detective Bureau and put through a four-week training program (Welch, p.66).

Police Commissioner Michael J. Codd (1977) in a report on police preparedness for terrorist events indicated that the hostage situation guide had been designed to "focus on functional team work, effective communications, and skilled coordination of tactics, under the management of a high ranking police commander" (p.3). A major change to the original draft of the plan, following John & Al's, was the establishment of "a group of specially trained negotiators responsible for communicating with barricaded suspects" in place of "the more traditional response of unconditional assault" (Taylor, 1983, p.64).

In 1974, the NYPD received a grant from the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Services to support the efforts which had been initiated post-Munich and revised as a result of John & Al's. A hostage confrontation response system, utilizing Detective Bureau investigators and ESU tactical specialists, was formalized. The investigators and the tactical officers were trained to "meet the problem of hostage negotiating and rescue" under the direction of an incident commander, according to a Police Department document Terrorism Control in

New York City (1979). The recommended guidelines had evolved into a Tactical Manual for Hostage Situations (1974).

The Emergency Service Unit of the NYPD is a highly diverse mobile force of uniformed officers with full-time citywide responsibility. The members of this all volunteer group must have extensive uniformed patrol experience before applying for a transfer into the ESU. The members are rescue oriented and perform a wide range of specialized tasks. According to their Operational Policies and Tactics (1977), among other tasks, they are certified Emergency Medical Technicians, take potential jumpers off bridges and buildings, handle radiation accidents, search for and transport improvised explosive devices and operate the Emergency Rescue Vehicle (a tank). “They are the [New York City Police] Department’s Firearms Battalion. They are the only members qualified to use tear gas. They are also skilled in the use of anti-sniper rifles, carbines, machine guns, and the shotgun, their most basic weapon” (p. 1). One chapter of their Operational Policies and Tactics manual was devoted to confrontations, which included “sniper, barricaded criminal/hostage, disorderly group/mob, civilian clothed member [and] dangerous psychotic” (p. 20). The Emergency Service Unit was selected to be the tactical [SWAT] component of the new hostage confrontation program because of its involvement in closely related activities for many years.

It was an Emergency Service Police Officer, Steve Gilroy, who was killed in the early stages of the siege at John & Al’s. It was not surprising that officers assigned to Emergency Service might resent, if not resist, creation of a new team of officers to perform part of their [ESU] jobs as described by Welch (1984).

The newly created Detective Bureau Hostage Negotiating Team was also an all volunteer function most often performed as needed by full-time New York City Police Investigators, primarily Detectives and Sergeants.

The decision to house the negotiator component of the new program in the Detective Bureau rather than Patrol or Special Operations was based on a variety of personnel factors which Schlossberg and Freeman (1974), Bard (1978) and Symonds (1980) had suggested as appropriate criteria for candidates to become successful hostage/crisis negotiators.

Since a range of other policing experiences had preceded assignment to the Detective Bureau, the investigator would be chronologically and experientially mature. Investigators worked in civilian clothes, which fit with the crisis intervention notion of non-hostile

representation of authority. Detective assignments are normally case driven as compared to uniformed patrol officers who are often radio-run-incident driven, so investigators do not have to be readily available for the next routine radio-run. Investigators are also expected to be competent in the gathering and analysis of intelligence as well as in conducting interviews and interrogations. These skills were deemed necessary for success in hostage/crisis negotiation.

To have been accepted as a negotiator, the volunteer investigator needed a positive recommendation from his commander, participated in a paper and pencil psychological examination and a follow-up interview with a police department psychologist, and had to be favorably interviewed by the Hostage Team Coordinator. Those chosen were then assigned to a four week training program, designed specifically for the purpose and including: psychology, physical fitness, firearms, electronic equipment, and liaison (Culley, 1974, p.3). Assigned full time in civilian clothes to various Detective Squads, a number of trained negotiators, based on geographic area of assignment, scheduled work time and any special qualifications, were called together for an incident. After the incident, the negotiators returned to their regular investigative duties. These individuals performed the additional duties of hostage/crisis negotiator, without additional pay, although their base investigator's salary was higher than the base pay of the uniformed Emergency Service Officers.

When the hostage confrontation program was formally launched, as a result of the critique of the John & Al's siege, the newly designated Hostage Coordinator, a Lieutenant assigned to the Brooklyn Detective command, was placed in charge and transferred into the Major Crimes Section of the city-wide Special Investigation Division. He was also responsible for various aspects of kidnap and extortion investigations.

There were several changes in the organizational placement and reporting lines of the hostage negotiation program between 1973 and 1983. Most were due to resistance or a lack of acceptance on the part of some senior police commanders during a period of adjustment for a new function. The personality of the hostage team coordinator and positive media attention to early successes of the team also created resentment. The team coordinator was an extremely outgoing individual who was also active in many social organizations within the Department. The New York media provided extensive coverage to the highly successful operational activities of the hostage negotiators and the coordinator was often available to a variety of interviewers. This was with the approval of the press office of the Police Department but yet engendered negative

reaction by other commanders. This is consistent with Welch's (1984) observation about organizational resistance in his examination of hostage situations.

Another change, which took place during this same time period, was in the types of incidents to which hostage/crisis negotiators were dispatched. Originally they responded only to confirmed hostage holdings and the ESU supervisor at the scene initiated the request for hostage/crisis negotiators. Gradually, based on hostage/crisis negotiation success, and accompanying positive media attention, they were dispatched to some non-hostage crisis situation such as barricaded criminals and people threatening suicide. Both of these functions previously had been the exclusive purview of the ESU. Contemporaneous with these expanded duties hostage/crisis negotiation personnel were also being utilized in kidnap and extortion cases, and in operational planning for high risk raid and warrant execution. A significant change took place with the publication of the Police Department's Interim Order # 51 (1984) when for the first time it was mandated that negotiators be dispatched to certain situations involving non-hostage holding emotionally disturbed persons. The ESU previously handled the majority of these situations without negotiators. This last change was the direct result of a critical incident that had resulted in the death of an emotionally disturbed person (see Loudon, 1998).

ASPECTS OF A HOSTAGE NEGOTIATION RESEARCH PROJECT

During 1999 I completed a study of hostage/crisis negotiation units in US police agencies. Data was collected from departments that employed at least 100 sworn officers. Six hundred sixty one state and local law enforcement agencies had responded to the Law Enforcement Management and Administrative Statistics: 1993 (1995) (LEMAS) survey conducted by the U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics indicating that they employed at least 100 officers. Langworthy had noted, "LEMAS data is an incredibly valuable vehicle for providing information about policing" (see Brady, 1996, p15). The selection of these 661 agencies for my study was based primarily on two factors. One factor was agency size; there are approximately 17,000 police agencies in the U.S. with department size varying from one individual to more than 35,000 sworn officers. However, Murphy & Plate (1977) suggested that small agencies probably did not have the resources to have their own hostage negotiation teams. Police Departments with at least 100 sworn officers would yield the most representative responses. The second factor in the sample selection was geographical diversity. All fifty states

and the District of Columbia, including municipal, county, sheriff, special police and state police agencies would provide the richest data. Federal law enforcement agencies and U.S. military agencies, which often have their own hostage/crisis negotiation teams, were not included.

This was a descriptive study designed to gather data about the formation and current status of hostage/crisis negotiation in U.S. policing. The study examined hostage/crisis negotiation and variables such as agency size, organizational structure, chain of command, written policy, and innovation. The opinions of respondents about satisfaction in hostage/crisis negotiation and about the effectiveness of negotiation were also examined. This study did not examine the inner workings of a hostage/crisis negotiation unit but focused on its relationship to the larger police organization.

An analysis of certain characteristics of police agencies in the United States as they pertain to hostage/crisis negotiation was the focus of the study. This questionnaire phase of the project yielded an original return rate of approximately 48% (315), including 39 (6%) that were not useable because they did not contain sufficient information (16) or indicated that the agency did not have a hostage/crisis negotiation team (23). Data from 276 (42%) returned questionnaires were utilized for analysis. Two hundred seventy-five of the respondents indicated that their agency had formed a hostage/crisis negotiation team. Some of the items considered follow (Louden, 1999).

Direct Action Orientation vs. Negotiation

Noesner and Dolan (1992), both FBI negotiators, have noted that from the first day of training and throughout their careers, police officers are taught to take the initiative to resolve situations that threaten life or property. They also cautioned that immediate, aggressive response might not be an appropriate course of action in every situation. Davis (1993) believed that law enforcement officers were generally action-oriented in a hostage crisis and that negotiation was underutilized. Wargo (1989) noted concern with the knowledge of the police officers on the scene about hostage/crisis policy. He was also interested in how to most effectively use personnel. Klein (1995) reported that hostage/crisis technique was very successful because of the ability of the police or military to contain and negotiate, but that most experts had focused on the negotiations within such operations. Nudell and Antokol (1991) noted that although hostage taking is only a small part of a greater problem it often has impact out of proportion to its actual

threat. They recommended a strategy of 'firm flexibility' in dealing with such incidents. This concept, which involves communication without substantial compromise, seems to mesh with the notion of 'dynamic inactivity' introduced by Schlossberg (Law Enforcement News, 1977). His 'dynamic inactivity' referred to a negotiation posture in which no overt activity appears to be taking place, but in reality, in addition to preparation for physical force maneuvers, there are also planning and calculation of alternatives designed to maximize a nonviolent outcome (Schlossberg, 1996). Over emphasis on an action imperative may cloud the deliberations of police administrators when devising possible strategies to counter terrorism.

SWAT vs. Negotiation

While always prepared and justified to use force, a hostage/crisis negotiation posture attempts resolution without unnecessarily resorting to violence. In a democracy police work often focuses a great deal of attention on means as opposed to ends, which has an important impact on how the job is to be performed (Kuykendall & Roberg, 1982). For example, discussions in policing dealing with concepts such as zero tolerance, pursuit driving or handling emotionally disturbed or mentally ill people may be related to justification for the use of force in a given incident. In each of these types of incidents an officer is faced with a choice of means in order to achieve a desired end. The discussion of ends-means is a persistent dilemma in law enforcement and may be relevant to locating the hostage/crisis negotiators in an agency; should it be part of the Special Weapons and Tactics Team (SWAT) or not. The SWAT concept is action oriented, most often associated with physical activities and specialized equipment. The negotiation concept is more communication and dialogue oriented, chiefly associated with patience and persuasion. Both concepts have the same end in sight, the safe resolution of a situation, but each emphasizes a different means. Each concept may actually be mutually dependent on its ability to perform successfully. An important consideration may be the placement of each unit in the overall departmental structure. Fifty-six percent (153) of the agencies responding to my questionnaire reported that their hostage/crisis negotiation team was organizationally a component of the SWAT team; 122 (44%) operated under some other organizational arrangement. Police chief executives and incident commanders may receive filtered information and advice when the negotiation function reports through the tactical element rather than directly to the decision maker.

Development of Written Policies

In previous research Borum and Strentz (1992) emphasized that a planned and tested response was required due to the volatility and complexity of hostage incidents. While Ochberg and Soskis (1982) indicated that only techniques, which have demonstrably worked in the past, should be used. MacWillson (1992) stressed that incident management, response planning, and strategic and tactical decision making help to determine the effectiveness of government in crisis management, which is often the responsibility of a police department. Whittle (1988) discussed issues, which must be considered in planning policies and procedures including resources, personnel and training. Friedland (1983) noted the need for constituent support for policy and public confidence in the soundness of government's [the police] decisions. Public support and confidence are more likely if policies are in writing. Cooper (1985) explored the feasibility of developing uniform standards for dealing with hostage situations. Policies cannot be effective over time if they are not formally written. As Severn (1993) noted the most important asset for a situation commander is a clear policy or standard operating procedure manual that defines the chain of command and lays out the agency's tactical principles, mission, and philosophy.

Eighty-one percent (222) of the respondents to my study had adopted a written policy for hostage/crisis negotiation incidents; 51 (19%) had not. In addition to asking if a written policy existed, I requested a copy of the policy. Only 60 (22%) were received. There was a wide range in degree of specificity. Two agencies provided a single page policy statement. Another agency provided a comprehensive document that exceeded 60 pages. Some policy documents contained recent revision dates; one agency provided a three page item dated 1975. An undated and untitled ten-page checklist, which apparently originated with a different agency, was submitted as its own from one responding agency.

Selection and Training of Negotiators

There had been a general lack of information on the selection and preparation of negotiating unit members. This made it problematic to have in mind the implementation of a standard to assess the readiness and competence of negotiating units and personnel. Hammer, et al. (1994) and Rogan, et al. (1994) reported that the majority of police departments did not have

written guidelines for the selection of hostage/crisis negotiators. Hammer also noted that initial hostage/crisis negotiator training consisted of up to ten days of training for 74% of the departments reporting. Culley (1974) reported that the initial training for the original hostage negotiation team was one month long.

As noted above, the majority of responding agencies (81%) had developed a written policy for hostage/crisis negotiation incidents. However, 56% (150) did not have a written policy for the selection of their negotiators. Whether written or not, there was a range of selection tools utilized by the respondents.

Even without a written selection policy, 99% of the responding agencies provided negotiator training to those individuals who had been selected. The range in the number of hours of initial hostage/crisis negotiation training was from a low of two hours, one agency (0.4%), to a high of 250 hours, again one agency (0.4%). The mean was 47 hours. The range of topics was as wide as the number of hours. In response to a series of questions about training topics, several respondents indicated that they were not aware of the curriculum provided to their personnel because it had been provided by another agency. Training was received from a variety of sources, including: 22% in-house; 14% by a regional academy; 13% by a state academy; 35% from the FBI; and 16% received their training from a non-law enforcement agency, usually a college or university.

Almost 75% did indicate that 'terrorism' was included in the negotiator-training program. The range was from a low of fifteen minutes for one agency to a high of fifteen hours for another agency. The mean time spent on terrorism related material was 2.23 hours.

Discussion

Most police departments in the US are local and small. Of the approximately 17,000 agencies only 749 have at least 100 sworn officers including 51 which employ 1,000 or more (LEMAS, 1999). Hostage holding and similar problems, whether motivated by crusaders, criminals or crazies (Hacker, 1976) can and do happen everywhere. It is incumbent on all police managers to be as prepared as possible, either in-house or through a mutual aid arrangement (see also Loudon, 1993).

Professional organizations such as the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the National Sheriffs Association (NSA), the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), and the Commission on Accreditation for Law enforcement Agencies (CALEA) should be utilized as resources in drafting or revising their hostage related practices. The larger agencies, e.g., NYPD, LAPD, etc., that have been engaged in formal hostage/crisis practices for many years are generally willing to share knowledge directly. Similarly, the newly formed National Council of Negotiation Associations (NCNA) and the FBI Crisis Negotiation Unit (CNU) are available to help. An often overlooked and thereby underutilized resource is the local college or university.

Regardless of the source(s) of information key points for discussion include:

Placement of the function in the organization

Written operational policy and procedure

Written selection policy

The design or selection of training programs.

The question is not if, but when and how!

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